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Abstract—Real time operation of the power grid and synchro-
nism of its different elements require accurate estimation of its
state variables. Errors in state estimation will lead to sub-optimal
Optimal Power Flow (OPF) solutions and subsequent increase in
the price of electricity in the market or, potentially overload
and create line outages. This paper studies hidden data attacks
on power systems by an adversary trying to manipulate state
estimators. The adversary gains control of a few meters, and
is able to introduce spurious measurements in them. The paper
presents a polynomial time algorithm using min-cut calculations
to determine the minimum number of measurements an adver-
sary needs to manipulate in order to perform a hidden attack.
Greedy techniques are presented to aid the system operator
in identifying critical measurements for protection to prevent
such hidden data attacks. Secure PMU placement against data
attacks is also discussed and an algorithm for placing PMUs
for this purpose is developed. The performances of the proposed
algorithms are shown through simulations on IEEE test cases.
I. INTRODUCTION
Stable and secure power grid operation relies on accurate
monitoring of the state of its different components, including
line currents and bus voltages. The state vector is estimated in
a power grid by using a variety of measurement units in differ-
ent buses and lines operating in the grid. These measurements
are also used to facilitate operation of the electricity market
through locational marginal pricing [3]. Given their importance
in the operation of the grid, error free delivery of data from the
distributed meters to the central controller for state estimation
is a critical need of every power grid. The effect of incorrect
data collection had received attention in the 2003 North-East
blackout where incorrect telemetry due to an inoperative state
estimator was listed as one of its principal causes [1]. Today
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems
help relay the measurements to the state estimator of the
grid for use in stability analysis and OPF solvers. However
the presence of distributed meters spread across the entire
geographical area covered by the power grid makes the grid
vulnerable to cyber-attacks aimed at introducing malicious
measurements. In fact, it has been reported that cyber-hacking
had previously compromised the U.S. electric grid [2] and can
lead to sub-optimal electricity prices [10].
We consider here a scenario where an adversary in the
power grid gains control of some meters in the grid and inject
malicious data which can lead to incorrect state estimation.
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In reality, measurements collected have random noise due to
measurement errors, but state estimators are able to overcome
those through the use of statistical methods like maximum
likelihood criterion and weighted least-square criterion [4]. A
coordinated attack on multiple meters by an adversary can
evade detection by the standard mechanism present at the
estimator and go unobservable and not raise any alarm at the
state estimator.
Reference [5] studies this problem of hidden attacks on the
power grid which are not detected by tests on the residual of
the measurements and shows that a few measurements are
enough for the adversary to produce a hidden attack. The
authors of [5] also show that the set of protected measurements
needed to prevent a hidden attack is of the same size as the
number of state variables in the grid. Full protection from any
hidden attack is thus very expensive. There have been multiple
efforts aimed at studying the construction of malicious attack
vectors for the adversary. In [8], the authors discuss the op-
timal attack-vector construction for the constrained adversary
using l0 and l1 recovery methods. A constrained adversary is
governed by its objective to manipulate the measurements of
the minimum number of meters to produce the desired errors in
estimation. Reference [6] provides an approach for the creation
of the optimal attack vector based on mixed integer linear
programming. Such design approaches are NP-hard in general
and hence require relaxations of the problem statement and
provide approximate solutions at best. In addition, previous
work such as that in [9] requires certain assumptions on states
of the system which may not hold in general.
In this paper, we consider an adversary with constrained
resources. Following the attack model in [8], we define the
objective of the adversary as identifying the minimum number
of meters that may be manipulated in order to create a hidden
attack vector using those meters. We use graph-theoretic ideas
like min-cut calculations in determining this optimal attack
vector. Unlike previous work, we show that our solution does
not require any assumption on the structure of the grid or
any relaxation of the problem statement. The complexity of
the algorithm for attack vector construction is shown to be
polynomial in the number of nodes (buses) and edges (lines) in
the power grid. Given the size of large power grids, polynomial
running time of the algorithm justifies its significance when
compared with NP-hard and brute force methods used in the
existing literature.
In addition, the algorithm for attack vector construction
does not depend on the exact values of the measurement
matrix used in state estimation, relying primarily on the
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2adjacency matrix of the network representing the power grid.
This is significant, since the adjacency matrix of grids is
often already known or can be approximated by an adversary
from publicly available information. Using the novel graph
theoretic framework discussed in this paper that requires only
the adjacency matrix of the graph representing the power grid,
the adversary can, thus, generate the optimal attack vector for
malicious hidden attacks on the grid using a polynomial time
algorithm.
We demonstrate that the power grid is significantly vulner-
able to hidden attacks from even constrained adversaries with
limited information (adjacency matrix in our case). We are
unaware of any existing work providing optimal solution to
this hidden attack problem in polynomial time. The framework
developed is easily extended to formulate attack vectors in
cases when certain measurements in the system are already
protected or the state vector is partially known, i.e., some of
the state variables are protected. We also provide algorithms
to select, in a greedy fashion, critical measurements for pro-
tection to prevent a hidden attack given the prior knowledge of
the adversary’s resources (maximum number of measurements
it can corrupt). Present power grids have additional meters
called phasor measurement units (PMUs) installed on a few
buses [14],[15]. Placement of a PMU at a given bus in the
power grid provides measurement of the voltage phasor at
that bus as well as the current flows of all lines incident on
that bus. We discuss PMU placement in power grids in the
context of hidden data attacks in detail in a separate section.
The problems discussed in this context include designing an
optimal attack vector for a grid equipped with PMUs, and the
selection of locations for placement of PMUs in the grid in
order to provide increased protection to the grid.
The main results of this paper are as follows:
• We provide a graph theoretic formulation for the problem
of constructing an adversarial optimal attack vector with
the minimum number of non-zero values that results in a
hidden attack on the grid. Further, we present a algorithm
that results in an exact solution to the problem and prove
its optimality and polynomial-time complexity.
• We discuss different variations of the adversarial attack
problem, given the knowledge of certain prevailing pro-
tected measurements and state variables within the grid.
We extend this discussion to power systems with PMUs
installed at a few buses.
• We present greedy algorithms to select additional pro-
tected measurements and locations for placement of
PMUs in the grid, in order to hinder an adversarial hidden
attack on the grid.
• We study the performance of the algorithms through
simulations on IEEE test bus systems and compare them
with other algorithms in literature, as well as with brute
force techniques.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next
section presents a description of the system model used in
estimating the state variables in a power grid and formulation
of the adversarial attack problem. The novel algorithm to
determine the optimal solution to this problem, which includes
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Fig. 1. IEEE 14-bus test system [11]
selection of the measurements to attack and generating the
attack vector, is discussed in Section III. Construction of
the attack vector in the presence of protected measurements
and state variables in the system is discussed in Section IV.
Algorithms to select existing measurements in the system for
protection to prevent hidden attacks on the grid are provided
in Section V. Power grids with installed PMUs are discussed
in Section VI wherein we design attack vectors for systems
with PMUs and also analyze the placement of additional
PMUs against hidden attacks for such systems. Simulations
of the proposed algorithms on test IEEE bus systems and
comparisons with other algorithms and brute force methods
are reported in Section VII. Finally, concluding remarks and
future directions of work are presented in Section VIII.
II. ESTIMATION IN THE POWER GRID AND ATTACK
MODELS
We represent the power grid using an undirected graph
(V,E), where V represents the set of buses and E represents
the set of transmission lines connecting those buses. There are
two kinds of measurements in the power grid in this model:
flow measurements and voltage phasor measurements. Meter
on a line in E measure the power flow through that line while a
meter on a bus in V measure the voltage phasor at that bus. In
addition, a PMU can collect both these kinds of measurements
(bus voltage and current flows in all lines connected to that
bus). This model is sufficiently general and can include cases
where some bus voltages or line measurements are measured
multiple times for redundancy. Figure 1 shows the graph
representation of the IEEE 14 bus test system. It can be found
at [11].
We consider the DC power flow model in a power grid
z = Hx+ e (1)
where z ∈ Rm is the vector of measurements. x ∈ Rn
is the state vector and consists of the voltage phase angles
at the buses in the grid. The voltage magnitudes are taken
as unity in the DC model. H is the measurement matrix
which relates the measurements with the state vector and
e is the zero mean Gaussian noise vector associated with
the measurements. In general, m > n which implies that
3there are more measurements than state variables to help
provide redundant measurements to the state estimator. Here,
H depends on the topology of the network, the location of
the meters as well as on the parameters of transmission lines
(like resistance and susceptance). The DC power flow on a line
(i, j) ∈ E between buses i and j is given by Bij(xi − xj),
where Bij is the magnitude of susceptance of the line (i, j).
If the kth measurement corresponds to this flow in line (i, j),
then zk is given by:
zk = Hkx = Bijxi −Bijxj . (2)
The associated row in the measurement matrix (Hk) is a sparse
vector with two non-zero values, Bij at the ith position and
−Bij at the jth position.
Hk = [0..0 Bij 0..0 −Bij 0..0] (3)
If zm measures the voltage phase angle at bus i (the voltage
magnitude is considered unity in the DC power flow model),
the corresponding row Hm in the measurement matrix is given
by:
zm = Hmx = xi (4)
⇒ Hm = [0..0 1 0..0] (5)
Here Hm is a sparse vector with one in the ith position and
zero everywhere else. The measurement matrix is, thus, very
sparse with a maximum of 2 non-zero values per row. In order
to enable correct state estimation, the measurement matrix
must have full column rank of n. The state estimator uses
the measurements and outputs the estimated state vector xˆ
by minimizing the residual ‖z −Hxˆ‖2. In normal operation,
the magnitude of the minimum residual is smaller than an
established threshold which monitors the correctness of the
estimate.
Given such an estimator, the adversary corrupts the measure-
ment vector z by adding an attack vector a to generate the new
measurements of the form zˆ = z+a. It is fairly straightforward
([5]) that, if a satisfies
a = Hc (6)
for some c ∈ Rn, then the residual calculated by the estimator
remains the same as before. Therefore the estimator remains
incapable of detecting the presence of an attack, outputting an
erroneous state vector estimate xˆ+ c.
Attack vector construction refers to the creation of an op-
timal attack vector a to corrupt the measurements. Reference
[5] creates such attack vectors by using a projection matrix
P using the measurement matrix H . A major problem of
interest here is the case of a constrained adversary with limited
resources. Such an adversary attacks the minimum number
of measurements to create a successful hidden attack. Here,
an attack is considered successful if at least 1 state variable
suffers a change in magnitude after the attack. Equivalently,
the construction of the attack vector a∗ can be characterized
as a solution of the following optimization problem :
min
a
‖a‖0
s.t. a = Hc, c 6= ~0 (7)
This is similar to the attacker’s problem in [8], where the
constraint c 6= ~0 is replaced by the constraint ‖c‖∞ ≥ τ .
Both these problem formulations are essentially the same as
every solution of Problem (7) can be suitably scaled to result
in a solution obtained in [8]. For every non-zero c, cτ/‖c‖∞
satisfies the constraint ‖c‖∞ ≥ τ .
In the next section, we present our algorithm for designing
an optimal attack vector using graph theory. Unlike [8], we
do not need the exact matrix H for our solution, but only the
locations of 1s in it.
III. OPTIMAL ATTACK VECTOR DESIGN
Consider the m times n measurement matrix H as noted
in (3) and (5). It is sparse and every row has either 1 (corre-
sponding to phase angle measurement or 2 (corresponding to
line flow measurement) non-zero elements. We first augment
one extra column hg to the right of the matrix H to create a
m times (n + 1) modified measurement matrix Hˆ such that
for every row Hm with a phase angle measurement, the new
column hg has a value of −1 at the mth location.
Hˆm = [Hm | − 1] (8)
For a line flow measurement Hk, the corresponding element
in the new column is 0.
Hˆk = [Hk | 0] (9)
The state vector c is now augmented to form a new state vector
cˆ =
[
c
0
]
which has 0 as the final element. We now have
a = Hc = Hˆcˆ = [H | hg]
[
c
0
]
(10)
Equation (10) holds as the last element of cˆ is 0. The new
formulation (Hˆ, cˆ) provides a reference phase angle of 0
(represented by the extra element in cˆ) such that phase angle
measurement at a bus becomes equivalent to a line flow
measurement between the bus and reference phase angle. Note
that every row in Hˆ has 2 non-zero elements and corresponds
to a line flow measurement now. Next, we state and prove
a theorem which will enable us to develop the algorithm for
attack vector.
Theorem 1. There exists a non-zero binary 0− 1 vector copt
of size n times 1 for the optimal attack vector a∗ given by
Problem (7) such that ‖a∗‖0 = ‖Hcopt‖0.
Proof: Consider Problem (7). Let the optimal attack
vector be given by a∗ = Hc∗. If c∗ is a 0 − 1 vector,
take copt = c∗ and the theorem is trivially true. If c is not
a 0 − 1 vector, construct n times 1 vector copt such that
copt(i) = 1(c∗(i) 6= 0), ∀i ∈ {1, n}. Consider ‖Hcopt‖0. For
every non-zero phase angle measurement in Hc∗, we have
a corresponding non-zero measurement in Hcopt. However,
in case of a non-zero value of line flow measurement in
Hc∗ between two neighboring buses i and j with c∗(i) 6=
0, c∗(j) 6= 0, the corresponding value of Hcopt is 0 as
copt(i) = copt(j) = 1. It, thus, follows from the structure
of the H matrix that ‖Hcopt‖0 ≤ ‖Hc∗‖0. Since a∗ = Hc∗
4is the optimal attack vector with minimum number of non-
zero entries, we have ‖Hcopt‖0 = ‖Hc∗‖0. Thus, Hcopt also
gives an optimal attack vector and ‖a∗‖0 = ‖Hcopt‖0.
Now, consider the modified measurement matrix Hˆ and the
augmented vector cˆ. Using Equation (10) and the previous
theorem, we conclude that the optimal attack vector is given
by a∗ = Hˆcˆopt where cˆopt is the 0−1 vector given by cˆopt =[
copt
0
]
.
Minimizing the number of measurements needed by the
adversary to inject the optimal attack vector is equivalent to
minimizing the number of non-zero flow measurements given
by Hˆcˆ. Since we are concerned only with ‖a‖0 and cˆ is a
0− 1 vector, we observe that the exact values of susceptance
present in Hˆ are not needed to get the optimal attack vector.
In fact, the contribution of a flow measurement of Hˆcˆ in ‖a‖0
will remain the same even if the susceptance Bij of every
line included in Hˆ is changed to 1. We, therefore, create an
incidence matrix AH of dimension m x (n + 1) from Hˆ by
replacing every positive element in Hˆ with a 1 in AH and
each negative element in Hˆ with to a −1 in AH . Zeroes are
left unchanged. The (i, j)th elements of Hˆ and AH are related
as
AH(i, j) = 1(Hˆ(i, j) > 0)− 1(Hˆ(i, j) < 0) (11)
The main result of this paper which gives the minimum
attack vector for the optimization Problem (7) is given in the
following theorem involving AH .
Theorem 2. The cardinality of the optimal attack vector in
Problem (7) with measurement matrix H is equal to the min-
cut of the undirected graph of n+ 1 nodes and edges defined
by the incidence matrix AH .
Proof: From the discussion above, it is clear that for
a given 0 − 1 vector cˆ, ‖Hˆcˆ‖0 = ‖AH cˆ‖0. Further, using
Theorem 1, the optimization Problem (7) can be written as
min
a
‖a‖0 (12)
s.t. a = AH cˆ, cˆ 6= ~0
cˆ is a 0− 1 vector with (n+ 1)th element 0
This is the classical min-cut partition problem in graph theory.
The minimum value of ‖q‖0 is, thus, given by the magnitude of
the min-cut of the undirected graph with AH as the incidence
matrix.
Note that multiple measurements of the same line-flow or
phase angle will lead to multiple edges between two nodes in
the associated graph. Formally, after pre-processing the initial
measurement matrix H to generate Hˆ and AH , the optimal
attack vector and its cardinality is given by Algorithm 1.
The optimal attack vector consists of the edges in the min-
cut and produces a non-zero change in the estimate of the
state variables at the nodes which are on the opposite side
of the min-cut as the reference node. The resulting attack
vector is indeed optimal as its cardinality is equal to the
min-cut. The min-cut computation is a well-studied problem
in graph theory and has a running time polynomial in the
number of nodes and edges in the graph [12]. Reference
Algorithm 1 Optimal Attack Vector (a∗) through Min-Cut
Input: Graph GH with incidence matrix AH
1: Compute the min-cut of the graph GH
2: c← 1
3: Choose (n+ 1)th node as root
4: Remove min-cut edges
5: Do breadth first path traversal from root
6: if node i is reached then
7: c(i)← 0
8: end if
9: a∗ ← Hc
[13] gives a simple algorithm for computing the min-cut in
O(|V |log|V | + |E|) time-steps. Here, |V | and |E| represent
the number of nodes and edges in the graph considered. The
algorithm presented above, to find the optimal attack vector,
has the following distinguishing characteristics which separate
it from other algorithms in literature:
• It finds the optimal solution of the optimization Problem
(7) without using a relaxation
• It is polynomial-time solvable
• It does not require the exact values of the line susceptance
in the grid, using instead, the locations of the measure-
ments in the network.
Next, we show how the Algorithm 1 can be used to
design the optimal attack vector in the presence of protected
measurements and state variables in the system.
IV. OPTIMAL ATTACK VECTOR CONSTRUCTION WITH
PROTECTED MEASUREMENTS AND STATE VARIABLES
Certain measurements in the power grid are protected from
cyber-attacks by encryptions or by geographical isolation.
This imposes a constraint on the adversary by requiring that
the values of the attack vector a corresponding to protected
measurements be made 0. Similarly, certain state variables
might be protected from adversarial contamination due to the
presence of secure channels of collecting their values. Let Sm
be the set of protected measurements and Sv be the set of
protected state variables. The optimal attack vector a∗ here
can be written as the solution of the following optimization
problem:
min
a
‖a‖0 (13)
s.t. a = Hc, c 6= ~0
HSmc = 0, c(i) = 0 ∀i ∈ Sv
where HSm represents the rows in the measurement matrix
corresponding to the protected measurements. Here, the ad-
versary needs to ensure that the vector c has values 0 for the
protected state variables, while the vector a has values 0 for
the protected measurements.
Following Problem (7), we consider the modified measure-
ment matrix Hˆ (given by Equations (3) and (5)) and the
augmented state vector cˆ =
[
c
0
]
by adding the reference node.
We first obtain the incident matrix AH from the modified
5measurement matrix Hˆ as per Equation (11). We denote the
graph represented by the incident matrix AH as GH . Every
measurement in AH leads to an edge in GH of unit weight.
The additional constraints due to the protected measurements
and state variables are incluuded in the graph GH through the
following modification as follows:
1. Create an edge of infinite weight between the buses with
protected state variables in Sv and the reference node.
2. Change the weights of edges with protected measurements
in Sm to infinity.
The resultant graph generated from GH after this modifi-
cation is denoted by G∗H . We, now, run the steps outlined in
Algorithm 1 on G∗H to obtain the optimal attack vector as
described in the previous section. We call this Algorithm 2
for completion.
Algorithm 2 Optimal Attack Vector (a∗) with protected
measurements and state variables
Input: Graph GH , protected state variables Sv and
measurements Sm
1: Modify GH to generate G∗H
2: Run Algorithm 1 on G∗H
In the solution of Algorithm 2, the modified edges (with
infinite weight) are not included in the attack vector given by
the min-cut to keep the value of the min-cut below infinity.
This ensures that the modification of GH to G∗H satisfies the
constraints arising due to protection and gives the optimal
solution.
l1 Relaxation: Problem (13) can also be relaxed and approx-
imately solved using a naı¨ve l1 relaxation by replacing the
non-convex l0 terms with l1 terms [16]. However, such an
approach leads to attack vector solutions with large cardinality
which are sub-optimal. To go around that, we use thresholds
in the formulation shown below to solve Problem 13:
min
a
‖a‖1 (14)
s.t. a = Hc, c ≥ ~0, 1T c > θ1
HSmc = 0, c(i) = 0 ∀i ∈ Sv
The final attack vector is obtained by thresholding the optimal
solution a∗(i) = 1(a∗(i) > θ2),∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ m, where m is the
length of the attack vector. Here, θ1 and θ2 are thresholds used
to decrease the cardinality of the solution attack vector. θ1 and
θ2 are taken as 1 and 10−3 respectively in our simulations in
Section VII.
Until now, we have discussed the adversary’s strategy for
designing attack vectors towards causing hidden data attacks
on the grid. We will use this knowledge in the next section to
discuss policies that can be adopted by the power grid system
operator or controller to restrict the efficacy of hidden attacks.
V. PROTECTION STRATEGIES AGAINST HIDDEN ATTACKS
Let us consider the system described in Problem (13).
Here, there are pre-existing secure measurements (set Sm)
and state variables (set Sv) in the grid. The corresponding
set of unprotected measurements and unprotected state vari-
ables will be termed Scm and S
c
v respectively. For complete
protection against hidden attacks, it has been shown in [5]
that HSm should have full column rank. In that case, the only
c satisfying the constraint HSmc = 0 is the all-zero vector.
However, for full column rank of n, the number of protected
measurements needs to be greater than n [5], and incurs a
great cost. Instead, we look at the problem of augmenting
the set of protected measurements Sm with k measurements
selected from the unprotected set Scm. Protecting additional
measurements leads to an increase in the cardinality of the
optimal attack vector ‖a∗‖0. This increases the number of
compromised measurements needed by the adversary for a
successful attack. We formulate this problem as follows:
max
S∗∈Scm
min
a
‖a‖0 (15)
s.t. a = Hc, c 6= ~0
HSmc = 0, HS
∗
c = 0
c(i) = 0 ∀ i ∈ Sv, |S∗| = k
The set of new protections S∗ of cardinality k is then used to
update the protected set Sm. As mentioned earlier, Sm, Sv , Scm
and Scv represent the sets of protected measurements, protected
state variables, unprotected measurements and unprotected
state variables in the grid respectively.
Protecting optimal k additional measurements is equivalent
to increasing the weights of k edges in the modified graph G∗H
(outlined in Section IV) to infinity to maximally increase the
value of the min-cut. This is a NP-hard problem. A brute- force
selection of measurements for protection is computationally
intensive and impractical given the large number of candidate
measurements in the set Scm in a real power grid. Hence, we
provide here a greedy approach for Problem 15 in Algorithm 3.
Here, Sm is updated in k steps. At each step, the best candidate
is chosen in a greedy fashion for protection given a∗, the
current optimal attack vector. After including a measurement
in the protected set Sm, a∗ is updated and used for selecting
the next candidate measurement for protection.
Step 4 of Algorithm 3 retains only the measurements
represented by the current min-cut of G∗H as candidates
for the next update in Sm. It ignores measurements outside
the current min-cut as protecting them does not lead to an
increase in the size of the min-cut of the updated graph. This
step, thus, leads to an reduction in the number of possible
candidates in each step from m − |Sm| to ‖a‖0 without any
loss of performance. The Algorithm is of course sub-optimal
compared to a computationally intensive brute force search of
the best measurements for protection.
VI. POWER SYSTEMS WITH PMUS: ATTACKS AND
PROTECTION
In this Section, we extend the ideas developed in the
previous sections to power grids with Phasor Measurement
Units (PMUs). A PMU located at a bus in the grid measures its
voltage phasor as well as the current flows of all lines incident
on that bus [7]. Previous work on PMU placement against
hidden measurement attacks [8], [9] assume full protection of
6Algorithm 3 Greedy Solution for Additional Protection
Input: Graph G∗H , attack vector a∗, protected set Sm
Output: Updated G∗H , a∗ and Sm
1: for i = 1 to k do
2: acm ← a∗
3: for j = 1 to m {m: total measurements } do
4: if a∗(j) 6= 0 then
5: Gtemp ← G∗H
6: Protect measurement j in Gtemp
7: Compute optimal attack vector atemp for Gtemp
8: if ‖atemp‖0 ≥ ‖acm‖0 then
9: cm← j {current best candidate}
10: acm ← atemp {current optimal attack vector}
11: end if
12: end if
13: end for
14: Protect measurement cm and update G∗H
15: a∗ ← acm, Sm ← Sm ∪ {cm}
16: end for
the PMU’s measurements. Recently, it has been shown that
PMUs do not have full security as they rely on civilian GPS
signals for real-time signalling that can thus be corrupted by
GPS spoofers [17]. Therefore, we consider both protected and
unprotected PMU measurements here.
A. Optimal Attack Vector for Grids with PMUs
The bus phase angles and line flow measurements calculated
by the unsecured PMUs are equivalent to other measurements
in the grid. We assume here that any measurement in an unse-
cured PMU can be independently corrupted by an adversary.
For secure PMUs, we consider all measurements recorded by
them as protected and include them in the protected set Sm
and the protected bus phase angles in the set of protected
state variables Sv . The attack vector is then given by running
Algorithm 2. The optimality of the attack vector follows from
the discussion for a general grid with protected measurements
given in Sections III and IV.
B. Protection against hidden attack by placing secure PMUs
In this case, we consider secure PMUs such that their
measurements are protected against any malicious attack. Each
PMU placed at a bus thus creates protected measurements
of the bus phase angle and incident line flows on that bus.
Optimal Placement of secure PMUs to ensure full protection
of all state variables against any adversary is equivalent to
a set-cover problem and is NP-hard in general. However,
approximate and distributed algorithms based on belief prop-
agation have been shown to provide optimal PMU placement
for several IEEE test systems [18]. Here, instead of full
protection, we look at the problem of placing additional k
secure PMUs to maximally hinder a hidden attack by the
adversary. We consider existing protected measurements and
protected state variables in the grid and denote them by Sm
and Sv respectively. It is worth noting that k PMUs might
not be sufficient to provide full protection to the entire state
vector. Thus, we look at maximizing the cardinality of the
optimal attack vector a∗ of the adversary instead. As discussed
in Section V, this is done by maximizing the min-cut of the
modified graph G∗H associated with the measurement matrix
H and protected sets Sm and Sv . We modify Algorithm 3
and provide a greedy algorithm, Algorithm 4, to determine
k bus locations, one at a time for placing secure PMUs. This
greedy algorithm runs k times and thus has a small complexity
compared to a brute force search. The performance of the
algorithm on IEEE test cases is reported in the following
section.
Algorithm 4 Greedy Solution for k secure PMU placement
Input: Graph G∗H , attack vector a∗, protected set Sm
Output: Updated G∗H , a∗
1: for i = 1 to k do
2: acm ← a∗
3: for j = 1 to n {m: total buses} do
4: Gtemp ← G∗H
5: Place PMU at bus j in Gtemp
6: Compute optimal attack vector atemp for Gtemp
7: if ‖atemp‖0 ≥ ‖acm‖0 then
8: cm← j {current best candidate bus}
9: acm ← atemp {current optimal attack vector}
10: end if
11: end for
12: Place PMU at bus cm and update G∗H
13: a∗ ← acm
14: end for
VII. SIMULATIONS ON IEEE TEST SYSTEMS
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our proposed
algorithms by simulating their performance on different IEEE
test bus systems, namely 14-bus, 30-bus and 118-bus systems.
Data about these test systems can be found at [11]. All
simulations are run in Matlab Version 2009a. We start by
discussing the performance of Algorithms 1 and 2 that are used
for constructing the optimal attack vector (a∗) of the adversary.
We take IEEE-14 bus system and place flow measurements
in all lines and voltage measurements on random 60% of
the buses. Figure 2 shows the increase in the average size
of the optimal attack vector with increase in the fraction of
randomly protected measurements placed in the system. We
see that plots generated by simulations of our algorithms and
that obtained through brute force search for the optimal attack
vector overlap completely, depicting optimal performance. It
can be seen from the same figure that the performance of our
algorithms are much better than the output of the l1 relaxation
given in Problem (14). Next, we plot the output of Algorithm
2 and show its improved performance over the output of a
l1 relaxation approach for 30, 57 and 118 IEEE test bus
systems under different system conditions in Figure 3. The
output of l1 relaxation is not close to optimal as commendable
performance of l0−l1 solvers requires the measurement matrix
7to satisfy certain necessary conditions [16]. Such conditions
are difficult to satisfy for test-systems where the network and
the measurement matrices are not random, as in our case.
We now present results on our approach to Problem (15),
which is given by Algorithm 3. Here, we select, in a greedy
fashion, the k best measurements for protection such that the
minimum number of measurements needed for a successful
hidden attack increases the most. Figure 4 shows the perfor-
mance of our greedy Algorithm 3 for different values of k for
the IEEE-14 bus system with flow measurements on all lines,
voltage measurements on 60% of the buses and 1/6 of mea-
surements initially protected. We observe that the performance
of the greedy algorithm in increasing the size of the optimal
attack vector is comparable to a computationally intensive
brute-force selection for protecting additional measurements
in this case. We also simulate Algorithm 3 for IEEE 30, 57
and 118 bus systems and plot the average improvement in the
cardinality of the optimal attack vector with an increase in
the value of k in Figure 5. It is important to note that the
minimum cardinality of the optimal attack vector a∗ does not
increase significantly with a small increase in k or fraction
of protected measurements in all the different test systems
considered. This observation can be explained using the fact
that the test-systems are sparse and have several buses with
low degree and thus have a low min-cut. Determination of
optimal attack vectors in the presence of secure PMUs for
the IEEE 30 and 57 bus systems is shown in Figure 6. In
either test system, we place line flow measurements in each
bus and phase angle measurements in 60% of the buses. We
observe an expected increase in the average size of the optimal
attack vector on increasing the fraction of buses randomly
selected for placement of secure PMUs. Finally, we show the
performance of Algorithm 4 in the IEEE 30-bus system. In the
base case, we put line flow measurements in each bus of the
system, phase angle measurement in random 60% of the buses
and protect 1/10 of the measurements selected randomly.
Algorithm 4 is used to place k additional PMUs on buses
to increase the cardinality of the optimal attack vector for the
system. We observe again that enough secure PMUs need to
be placed in the grid to significantly increase the cardinality
of the optimal attack vector as high sparsity of the network
graph and low degrees of the nodes keep the graph min-cut
low.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study an adversarial problem of causing
errors in estimation of state variables in a power grid through
injection of suitably hidden measurement errors. We formulate
this problem in terms of controlling and manipulating a
minimum set of measurements in order to affect a successful
hidden attack as an l0 optimization problem. We introduce
a novel graph-theoretic approach to designing the optimal
attack vector using min-cuts. The proposed algorithm has
polynomial time complexity and is shown to result in an
optimal output given a configuration of the power grid. We
show that our algorithm gives the optimal output even when
a fraction of the measurements have existing protection and
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Fig. 3. Optimal hidden attack on IEEE test systems with flow measurements
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measurements randomly protected
performs much better than a l1 relaxation of the problem. From
the system operator’s perspective, we develop an algorithm to
identify measurements in the system that provide additional
protection, aimed at preventing and/or reducing the efficacy
of hidden attacks by an adversary. Although sub-optimal, the
low complexity algorithm can be used to protect measurements
to increase the set of measurements that the adversary must
control in order to cause a successful hidden attack on the
system. Further, we extend the discussion on hidden attacks in
the grid to systems with PMUs and discuss design of optimal
attack vector for a system with PMUs and placement of
additional secure PMUs in the system to prevent such attacks.
The advantage of using low complexity algorithms to provide
security against hidden attacks is immense for large power
grids with several thousand buses and lines. This work can be
extended to include other hidden attacks where the adversary is
not limited by number of attacked meters but other resources.
Another extension includes determining the minimum set of
key measurements for protection by the system operator given
the knowledge of the adversary’s maximum capacity to attack
the power grid. This is the focus of our current work.
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